Reimaging Xianity in the wake of Modernism's passing
The Resurrection of Drama – A Review of Kingdom Triangle by Moreland
In this wildly ambitious work, Moreland seeks to cure Christianity from the malaise that plagues – the death of drama; he is mostly successful, though not for the reasons he would give. Written for a popular audience, the Kingdom Triangle is divided into two sections; the first attempts to show us the “crisis of our age,” attacking Naturalism and Postmodernism as the destroyers of drama. The second part is more hopeful, and is Moreland’s attempt to construct a solution to the problem by means of three foci: knowledge, the soul and supernaturalism. With his insistence upon objectivity and reluctance to engage the best of Christian postmodern thought, readers risk being more entrenched against any other approach to knowledge and theology. However, the other parts of the work shine in comparison. When Moreland is attacking naturalism and working to instill drama he is much more effective. This combination of strengths and weaknesses make this book a minefield for the lay reader. There is much good to be had, but one can easily get the impression that all postmodern and emerging Christians are to just as feared and protected against as the Catholic Church.[1]
Drama for your mamma (and the rest of the Body of Christ)
The chief contribution of this work is Moreland’s drive to instill drama in our lives. Moreland’s use of drama is interesting and is the most important theme in the book. Moreland sets it up as the life full of meaning and purpose contrasting it with the drabness of everyday life. His awareness of the hunger for drama is startling and speaks to a need which likely resonates with much of his readership. Wise are the ways Moreland suggests Christians resurrect drama and acute are the causes he identifies for its crucifixion. He identifies the narcissism, individualism, passivity, and immaturity of the self that our popular culture produces;[2] and advocates the flourishing of the self, which includes the development of self-denial, character, and the spiritual disciplines.
Don’t, Stop, Manifesting the Spirit…
Perhaps the most controversial part of the book for the target audience is Moreland’s insistence that we recover the activity of the Spirit in our daily lives. He calls this “being naturally supernatural”[3] and attacks Cessationists. In great contrast to his dealings with Postmodernist Christians and Catholics, he advocates love and charity towards people on different places on the continuum of the Spirit’s activities.[4] This advice is much needed in the North American Church today. He primarily challenges Cessationists by appealing to personal stories and the numbers of Charismatics in the world. Oddly enough, Moreland does not use Scripture to challenge Cessationists. Given his high view of and condemnations by means of Scripture, one would have expected the same here. Ultimately, his wisdom, gentleness, and honesty are instructive in this section.
I refute him thus!
“I refute him thus!” was Samuel Johnson’s exclamation as he broke his foot upon a rock in an attempt to refute Berkley’s idealism.[5] It is also method of attack Moreland employs in his critiques of Naturalism and Postmodernity.[6] Moreland’s treatment of Postmodernism is the chief disappointment Kingdom Triangle. Moreland, the unapologetic modernist,[7] constructs the frailest version of postmodernism possible for the purposes of rendering asunder with the mighty blows of the three-sentence-proof. Moreland goes so far as to dismiss and critique of his characterization of postmodernism by saying: “For one thing, my description of postmodernism is an accurate account that fairly captures and understanding of postmodernism … [so] I can hardly be accused of offering a caricature of the movement.”[8] This rather grumpy, defensive, and dismissive tone is found throughout his discussion of Naturalism, Postmodernism, and Knowledge. Moreland unfortunately, for one of Evangelical Christianity’s most highly regarded philosophers, reduces all of postmodernity into a “synonym for deconstructive relativism.”[9] Too often Moreland attacks his constructed postmodernism[10] with simplistic proofs which bypass the real issues at hand. An excellent example of this is his discussion of objectivity and language.[11]
This seems like a rhetorical strategy to appeal to the value of common sense and anti-intellectualism of his intended audience. This, combined with a lack of real engagement of the best of Christina postmodern theory will hinder the intellectual development of his readers in the wake of Modernity’s decline. It reeks of entrenchment rather than engagement.
The Gentle Curmudgeon
One final criticism of Kingdom Triangle is the bipolar writing style that Moreland employs. When attacking Naturalism and Postmodernism and constructing a theory of knowledge, Moreland writes in a grouchy, dismissive, and immature tone. He repeatedly deems things “sad” and uses brute force to argue his claims (see his listing to all the verse in the Bible that contain the word knowledge).[12] This is contrasted with the genuine love and concern from which he writes his other chapters.
Conclusion
Ultimately this book is a mix of the best and worst from Moreland. Moreland argues for the best possible modernist/foundationalist Christianity, and attacks the worst postmodern secularism, which he ties to all Christian postmodern thought. However, With the exception of the chapter on Knowledge, Christians would be wise to heed his words concerning the resurrection of drama. I would modify Moreland’s argument (that Naturalism and Postmodernism have caused the death of drama) to the Church’s acceptance of Modernism and lack of a response to its death have caused and sustained the death of drama. It is a shame this was not a two-volume work.
Notes:- Moreland is deeply skeptical in this work about the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church , warning evangelical Christians to steer clear of their spiritual development classes (p.159). [↩]
- Moreland, Kingdom Triangle, 142-145. [↩]
- Ibid., 182. [↩]
- Ibid., 178-179. [↩]
- For more on this, see Dinesh D’Souza, What’s so great about Christianity (Regnery Publishing, 2007), 171. [↩]
- While Moreland and I agree on the perils of Naturalism, Moreland has a too narrow of a definition of postmodernism, see notes 12 and 13. [↩]
- See his infatuation with the self and objectivity, and unquestionable support of the correspondence theory of truth in Moreland,Kingdom Triangle, 78-88. and dismissal of critiques of modernity, such as the role of language creating worlds rather than nakedly describing them in Ibid., 85, 87. [↩]
- Ibid., 87. [↩]
- Franke, Character of Theology, The, 21. [↩]
- It is difficult to construct a positive definition of the varied modes of postmodernist theory. I follow Franke in maintaining that Postmodernism is best defined minimally as the critique of Modernity which requires “radical surgery.” See Ibid. [↩]
- Compare Moreland, Kingdom Triangle, 86. with Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), sec. The Problem of Language. [↩]
- Moreland, Kingdom Triangle, 114-120. Moreland opts for the brute-force technique for arguing that our knowledge must be certain (by his criteria and his criteria only, which happens to be foundationalist in nature). [↩]
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about 5 months ago
The correspondence theory of truth is hardly modern. It goes back at least to Plato. One can maintain the basic correspondence theory of truth and a foundationalist model of the structure of knowledge, insist that the concept of the self is philosophically important, and maintain the basic concept of objectivity without succumbing to the problems of what postmodernists call modernism. It's not as if such things require believing knowledge is Cartesian certainty or that all truth is objective in the sense of being publicly available and third-person. I wonder if your conception of analytic philosophy involves a similar problem to what you accuse Moreland of doing to postmodernism.
about 5 months ago
Absolutely re: correspondence theory, Jeremy. And it's suffered the same problems since then. I mention it not because it was cooked up by the Enlightenment, but because it is a central feature of Moreland's (and others) modernistic outlook. It works great on the small scale, with objects in our immediate vicinity, but breaks down when applied universally.
My conception of analytic philosophy may – but I don't pretend to be an expert, as Moreland does in Postmodern theology and philosophy. I am primarily a student of antiquity and religion, not philosophy, so I rely on secondary literature, such as Franke and Grenz for my outlooks.
But, so far, your comment only really touched one minor footnote. I think that even if I am a bit harsh on Moreland in that note, the vast, vast majority of what I talk about in the review holds and holds tight.
But hey, thanks for the feedback Jeremy.
about 5 months ago
I haven't read the book, so I can't comment on what you say about Moreland. It was what you said about particular philosophical theses that seemed wrong to me.
I just don't see the correspondence theory of truth as particularly modern. I see it in Plato, and it's explicit in Aristotle and Aquinas. It's true that Descartes and Hume hadn't yet gotten to a point of rejecting it, but the most persistent rejection of it is also modern. The logical positivists rejected it in favor of a verificationist theory of truth. The pragmatists rejected it in terms of their own pragmatic theory of truth (although that too apparently goes back to the sophists). Coherence theories of truth appear in postmodern philosophers, but the early 20th century had several modernist thinkers defending such a view. As such views have been roundly rejected in recent analytic philosophy, they haven't gone back to the correspondence theory, which they see as medieval. The deflationary theory of truth reigns dominant. I think it assumes a notion of correspondence anyway (between language and the world), but hardly anyone seems to see that. Correspondence theories today don't hold themselves up in contrast to postmodernism, though. They see themselves as a contrast with deflationary theories.
I'm not sure which problems you have in mind for correspondence theories. One objection is the modernist concern that there are no moral facts, so there can't be correspondence between moral truths and moral facts. No Christian of any stripe should have much patience with such a view. Another is the contention of the positivists (as modern a group as there could be) that there are no logical facts (because such things aren't empirically verifiable). There's also the very modernist objection that a naturalistic view of the universe doesn't allow a relation that somehow magically connects my beliefs with facts across space and time, a relation that doesn't seem physical. There's also the modernist concern for desert landscapes, keeping ontological commitment to a minimum, and thus not liking facts corresponding to negative statements (e.g. there are no unicorns), disjunctive statements (e.g. Barack Obama is president or my mother is Harry Potter's Aunt Petunia), universal claims (e.g. all dogs are mammals), and counterfactual truths (e.g. if Sodom and Gomorrah had been presented with what Jesus did in Capernaum, they would have repented). It strikes me that such a ground for rejecting a proposed fact is precisely a modernist tendency.
It seems to me that the paradigm view of truth among contemporary modernists is the deflationary view. It's true that some modernists have held a correspondence theory, but many have held other theories. This issue just doesn't map well onto the modernist/postmodernist spectrum. Postmodernists generally don't like the correspondence view, but most modernists nowadays don't either, and the view began in the ancient world, not in modern times, so the fact that some moderns did hold it, even if many others have not, shouldn't lead us to associate it with modernism just because postmodernists don't like it.
It's been a long time since I've read Grenz, but I wasn't very impressed when I looked at his work years ago. I've never looked at Franke. Soft postmodernists like Charles Taylor, Jacques Ricoeur, Kevin Vanhoozer, and Miroslav Volf would be better people to look to for seeing valuable insights in the work of the hard postmodernists (Derrida, Foucault, Fish, Rorty) without committing the intellectual suicide that those figures engage in. I didn't get the sense that Grenz really understood what was at stake if you accept some of the theses he wanted to endorse, and the soft postmodernists seem to me to have some understanding of those problems.
about 4 months ago
I'd suggest a close and open re-reading of Grenz. Beyond Foundationalism and A Primer on Postmodernism are the two work's I've read recently. Franke's The Character of Theology is all I've read, and I'd recommend reading it as well. Grenz, at the end of A Primer does seem quite sensitive to the problems, though he leaves them as questions to be answered later. BF and TCoT by each take those questions up and offer preliminary answers.
Volf is next on my radar.