Foundationalism

I worry about your formulation of foundationalism and the conclusions you draw from it. You define foundationalism as such:"Foundationalism is a modernistic epistemological framework which attempts to build a solid foundation of undeniable and fully provable (often by the criteria listed above) truth propositions upon which all other forms of knowledge are built."Defining foundationalism this way is too simple and naive. Foundationalism is a complex and multifaceted epistemological theory that can take many forms and be explicated in different ways. Here are some points of contention:1. Foundationalism is not a modernistic theory per se. Although many modern philosophers held to some form of foundationalism, the philosophical import given to foundationalism has its origins in Aristotle (cf. Posterior Analytics, Bk. l, chap. 2 & 3), and perhaps even Plato (cf. the Third Man argument from the Parmenides, and the discussion of the nature of virtue in the Meno). Moreover, epistemic foundationalism can also be found the works of such medieval greats as Augustine and Aquinas. Finally, there are many contemporary proponents of foundationalism who in no way can be characterized as followers of the early moderns with respect to their philosophical endeavors (e.g. Alvin Plantinga, Alvin Goldman, Michael Bergmann).Your Venn diagram entails the claim “All foundationlists are modernists.” But this is false given the counterexamples from above. To provide a polemic against foundationalism is really not to argue against a specifically modern theory of which we must disabuse ourselves, but it is really to argue against a theory held by some of the giants of Western philosophy. 2. You claim that all fundamentalists are foundationalists, but foundationalists with respect to what? In order to critique foundationalism, you must be clear what sort of foundationalism you are critiquing, for some are foundationalists with respect to justification, some with respect to warrant, and others with respect to knowledge. Generally, the early moderns are characterized as foundationalists with respect to justification, which I assume is what you are critiquing. Yet you also say that foundationalists build a solid foundation upon which all other forms of knowledge are built (emphasis on “knowledge”). You also later claim, “Many, if not most, evangelical groups subscribe to a Foundationalist framework for building knowledge.” So it is unclear if you are concerned with foundationalism with respect to justification or with respect to knowledge/warrant.3. Another claim that requires clarification: you say that foundationalism “attempts to build a solid foundation of undeniable and fully provable (often by the criteria listed above) truth propositions…”. However, not all forms of foundationalism require that knowledge/justification rest upon truth claims that are undeniable or fully provable. The specific form of foundationalism you are concerned with is classical (or Cartesian) foundationalism, which is a sub-genre of foundationalism simpliciter. Foundationalism in general (F) is defined as: there are justified/warranted beliefs that justified/warranted not in virtue of being inferred or based on other beliefs. A simpler way of defining F is the claim “there are properly basic beliefs” (i.e. beliefs that are non-inferentially justified/warranted). However, you seem to be only concerned with classical foundationalism, not foundationalism in general. Classical foundationalism (CF) is defined as: there are properly basic beliefs and a belief P is properly basic if and only if P is self-evident or indubitable. Ergo, Descartes claims that the only beliefs that are properly basic are beliefs like “I am having the appearance of red” “I am in pain” “I think”, for all such beliefs are true in virtue of being believed.This is a serious problem though for how you sketch foundationalism. Your claims are really an attack on CF, but disguised as an attack on F. Many, if not all, of the contemporary philosophers who hold to F have come to reject CF. Consider, as an alternative to classical foundationalism, Reidian foundationalism (namesake of Thomas Reid), which allows for such beliefs as perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, beliefs in God, and even beliefs concerning the inerrancy of Scripture to be properly basic beliefs. Thus, for the fundamentalist Christians who holds to Reidian foundationalism (e.g. many Reformed Christians are Reidian foundationalists), your critique of foundationalism is seen as a gross non sequitur and irrelevant to their views. 4. Given this consideration of Reidian foundationalism, consider your claim: “[Evangelical foundationalists] assert the absolute truth of the Bible, but, because of their unnoticed acceptance of the modernist and foundationalist framework, they feel as though they must prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the foundation that is the Bible.” But this claim is false for the adherents to more nuanced forms of foundationalism. In fact, the need to prove the Bible (whatever that means) is no longer necessary for the some foundationalists, since the inerrancy and truth of Scripture is taken as a properly basic claim that requires no substantiation. One can reasonably and justifiably accept the inerrancy of Scripture in the absence of defeaters, despite the fact one may not be able to provide evidence or a proof of that claim. 5. What follows from this then is that systematic theologies no longer must rest upon deductively proven, indubitable truth claims. Rather systematic theologies are not as rigid as you claim, for they can easily be constructed given such common sense beliefs as metaphysical realism, the perspicuity of Scripture, and the faculty of the Holy Ghost who aids and guides us through our discovery of God via his Word. Of course there is a human element to any interpretation of Scripture and our constructions of systematic theologies, but why is that a problem? There is a human element to all of our acquisitions to knowledge, but that doesn’t mean we must be skeptics. The point is that some forms of foundationalism can account for such non-rigid theologies that are continuously being refined and discussed as we learn more about God and His Word (cf. the Reformed creed of semper reformanda).6. In sum, you conclude: “We need to move beyond Foundationalism, beyond Modernism,” and “The scary thing is that we have to leave modernism behind. Any such task is fought with fear because this necessarily means that we have to be postmodern.” First, I think my points have demonstrated that you have given us no reason to leave foundationalism simpliciter behind, but at best you have only shown the demerits of classical foundationalism. I am interested to see an argument against F, not CF. Second, you state that necessarily, if one rejects modernism, then one accepts post-modernism. However, I find that this claim is dubious, as if we fall under either a modernist and postmodernist paradigm. I think that this formulation of the debate is unfair, for there many examples of historic and contemporary Christian philosophers/theologians who are neither modernists nor postmodernists. Even a cursory knowledge of such men as Herman Bavinck, Thomas Reid, and Pietro Vermigli will show this to be the case. But this would require us to move beyond the modernist/postmodernist dichotomy; hopefully though, this should not be too "scary."